What orthodoxy can gain from academic biblical studies : the Torah as political theory by Berman, Joshua
What Orthodoxy Can Gain From Academic Biblical Studies: The Torah as Political 
Theory[1] 
 
 
by: Joshua Berman 
 
Joshua Berman is a lecturer in Tanakh at Bar-Ilan University and an Associate Fellow at the 
Shalem Center. He is the author of Created Equal: How the Bible Broke with Ancient 
Political Thought (Oxford University Press, 2008) which was the National Jewish Book 
Award Finalist in Scholarship for 2008.  
 
  
 
    In ways that were astonishingly new and counter-intuitive, in ways that served the purposes 
of no known interest group, the political philosophy of the Torah may be seen to rise like a 
phoenix out of the intellectual landscape of the ancient Near East. Throughout the ancient 
world the truth was self-evident: all men were not created equal.  It is in the five books of the 
Torah that we find the birthplace of egalitarian thought.  When seen against the backdrop of 
ancient norms, the social blueprint found in the Torah represents a series of quantum leaps in 
a sophisticated and interconnected matrix of theology, politics and economics.   
 
    To appreciate the claim that the Torah represents the dawn of egalitarian thought, let us set 
the claim in historical perspective.  It is only in the European revolutions of the 18th and 19th 
centuries that the privileges of rank and nobility are rejected, and the entrenched caste, feudal, 
and slave systems delegitimated.  Greece and Rome had known their respective reformers, yet 
nowhere in the classical world is there evidence of a struggle to do away with class 
distinctions.[2] None of the ancient authors championed egalitarianism in their ideal systems. 
“From the hour of their birth,” wrote Aristotle, “some are marked out for subjection, others 
for rule.”[3] It was assumed that some would be rich and that many, many more would be 
poor. Not simply because that's the way things were, but because that was the way things 
were actually supposed to be. For Aristotle, justice meant that equals be treated as equals and 
unequals as unequals.[4] The Greeks and Romans possessed an overwhelming belief in the 
harmony of various classes. The medieval mindset, too, believed that in an ordered society 
each socioeconomic class performed its tasks for the common good.[5] Political theorists 
from classical times through the Italian Renaissance, assumed that independence and freedom 
could not be achieved by those who did not already possess it.[6]  Social stratification was 
likewise the norm in the empires and lands of the ancient Near East. Not a culture in the 
region believed in the ideal of a society without entrenched class divisions that were founded 
on the control of economic, military, and political power.  
 
        To be sure, the Torah manifestly speaks of multiple classes of individuals within the 
Israelite polity, an order which may not be termed egalitarian in the full sense of the word. 
The Torah speaks of those with entitlements and privileges, such as the king, priests and 
Levites.[7] But the control of economic and political resources enjoyed by these groups is 
greatly attenuated in contrast to the surrounding cultures of the ancient Near East. Most 
significantly, the Torah rejects the divide between a class of tribute imposers, which controls 
economic, and political power and an even larger class of tribute bearers. In its place, the 
Torah articulates a new social, political, and religious order, the first to be founded upon 
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homogeneous class.  
 
* * * 
 
    The revolution of political thought in the Torah begins with a revamping of theology: for 
people to think anew about politics, they would first have to think anew about theology. Our 
view of things political as distinct from things religious is a thoroughly modern notion: not a 
single culture in the ancient Near East has a word for “religion” as distinct from “state”.  The 
Tanakh reflects a world in which theological beliefs were intimately bound up with the 
politics of the times and the support of social hierarchy.  
 
    To appreciate just how intimately politics and theology went hand in hand in the ancient 
world, imagine that we are archeologists digging up an ancient culture called “America.”  
Deciphering its religious texts, we discover that the paramount god of the pantheon was 
“Commander in Chief,” who resided in a heavenly palace, or temple called "White House," 
and would traverse the heavens in his vehicle, Chariot One.   We further discover that 
Commander in Chief had a consort known as "First Lady"—herself a goddess of apparently 
meager powers, yet assumed by some to possess a keen aesthetic sense. Our digging would 
further reveal that opposite "White House" in the heavens, was another temple, this one 
domed and populated by 535 lesser, regional deities, who routinely schemed and coalesced 
into partisan groupings, and who were known, on occasion, to have been able to depose 
Commander in Chief.  
 
    Put differently, what we would discover is that the institutional order “down below” is 
parallel to the divine order “up above.”  This phenomenon, whereby the political structure of 
the heavens mirrored that of the earthly realm, was nearly ubiquitous in the ancient world, and 
it is easy to see why. Political regimes are, by definition, artificial, constructed, and therefore 
tenuous:  there is no real reason why one person should reign, and not another. A regime can 
receive immeasurable legitimation, however, if the masses underfoot believe that it is rooted 
in ultimate reality and unchanging truth; that the significance of the political order has cosmic 
and sacred basis.  The heavenly order mirrors the earthly order because ancient religion is a 
mask that covers over the human construction and exercise of power.[8] 
 
        For example, we find that the chief god of the Mesopotamian pantheon, Enlil, utterly 
resembles his earthly counterpart, the king.   Enlil, like the king, rules by delegating 
responsibilities to lesser dignitaries and functionaries. Like his earthly counterpart, he presides 
over a large assembly. He resides in a palace with his wives, children, and extended 
"house.”[9]   Generally speaking, the gods struggled to achieve a carefree existence and 
enjoyed large banquets in their honor. Like kings, gods needed a palace, or what we would 
call a temple, where they, too, could reside in splendor in separation from the masses, with 
subjects caring for their every physical need.  
 
        If a god wanted something, say a temple repaired, or the borders expanded, he 
communicated through various agents with the king, and the king was his focus.[10] The gods 
never spoke to the masses, nor imparted instruction to them.  Ancient creation myths depict 
the masses serving a single purpose: to toil and offer tribute. Common humans were servants, 
at the lowest rung of the metaphysical hierarchy. The gods were interested in the masses to 
the extent that a baron or feudal lord would have interest in ensuring the well-being of the 
serfs that run the estate and supply its needs.[11] Servants, no doubt, play a vital role in 
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and undignified role.  
 
    The  Torah  achieves  a  dual  accomplishment  as it reconfigures theology in a way that 
supports an egalitarian agenda: it articulates a portrait of the heavens that strips earthly 
hierarchies of power of their sacral legitimation.   Moreover, it provides a theological 
grounding for the existence of a homogeneous nation of equal citizens.   
 
    This is achieved through the Exodus and the revelation at Sinai - stories that would have 
made a distinct and unusual impression on the ancient mind. The ancients had no problem 
believing that the gods could split the seas, or descend in fire upon a mountaintop. Yet the 
Exodus and Sinai stories required an enormous stretch of the imagination, as they required 
listeners of subsequent generations to believe in political events that were without precedent 
and utterly improbable, even in mythic terms. Slaves had never been known to overthrow 
their masters.  Gods had never been known to speak to an entire people. In propagating the 
story of an enslaved people simply upping and outing, however, the Torah also pre-empted 
claims of election and immanent hierarchy within the Israelite nation.   The Exodus story 
effectively disallowed any Israelite to lay claim to elevated status. All Israelites emanate from 
the Exodus—a common, seminal, liberating, but most importantly equalizing event.  
 
        Although the revelation at Sinai is usually conceived in religious terms, its political 
implications are no less dramatic, and constitute the bedrock of the egalitarian theology the 
Torah sought to adduce. Elsewhere, the gods communicated only to the kings, and had no 
interest in the masses. But at Sinai, God spoke only to the masses, without delineating any 
role whatever for kings, and their attendant hierarchies.[12]  Archeological findings allow us 
to grasp the way in which the Sinai narrative transforms the masses into kings.   
 
    Here’s how it works: As scholars noted more than fifty years ago, the pact, or covenant 
between God and Israel displays many common elements with what are known in biblical 
studies as ancient Near Eastern vassal treaties between a great king and a weaker one. In these 
treaties the more powerful king acts on behalf of a weaker, neighboring king: sensing an 
opportunity to foster a loyal ally, he may send food during a famine, or soldiers to break a 
siege.  In return, the lesser king demonstrates his appreciation to the powerful one by agreeing 
to a series of steps that express his gratitude and loyalty.  In these treaties the vassal king 
retains his autonomy and is treated like royalty when he visits the palace of the powerful 
king.  Having been saved from Egypt by God, the Israelites sign on at Sinai to a vassal treaty 
as sign of loyalty, becoming subordinate partners to the sovereign king, God. 
 
    The theological breakthrough of the Hebrew Torah the transformation of the status and 
standing of the masses, of the common person, to a new height, and the elimination of nobles, 
royalty, and the like.  In the Torah, the common man received an upgrade from king’s servant 
to servant king.[13]  
 
    The ennoblement of the common man is manifested in the very notion that the accounts of 
Exodus and Sinai should be promulgated among the people as their history. The point 
requires a note of context for us as moderns.  Although there are over one million inscriptions 
in our possession from the ancient Near East, there is nowhere evidence of a national 
narrative that a people tells itself about its collective, national life, of moments of 
achievement or of despair that is recorded for posterity.  
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gods, kings and nobles.[14]   The stories were written, oddly enough, for the gods 
themselves—as witnessed by the fact that these texts were often discovered in temple 
libraries, buried, or in other inaccessible locations. Myths were recited to remind the gods of 
their responsibilities. Texts that detail a king's achievements on the battlefield were read as a 
report to a deity about the king's activities on his or her behalf.  They were not composed for 
the masses. 
 
    In an age and place such as our own, where literacy is nearly ubiquitous, access to texts of 
many kinds and the knowledge they bear is unfettered and, in theory, available to all. But in 
the ancient world physical access to written texts and the skills necessary to read them were 
everywhere highly restricted. The production and use of texts in the cultures of the ancient 
Near East as well as of ancient Greece were inextricably bound up with the formation of class 
distinctions: those who could read and write were members of a trained scribal class who 
worked in the service of the king.[15]   Writing originated in the ancient Near East as a 
component of bureaucratic activity. Systems of writing were essential for the administration 
of large states. The elite in these cultures had a vested interest in the status quo, and had an 
interest in preventing others from gaining control of an important means of communication. 
Far from being interested in its simplification, scribes often chose to proliferate signs and 
values. Both cuneiform writing in Mesopotamia and hieroglyphics in Egypt are systems of 
writing whose signs and symbols run into the hundreds. The texts produced in Mesopotamia 
were composed exclusively by scribes and exclusively for scribal use—administrative or 
cultic, or in the training of yet other scribes.  
 
    The Cambridge anthropologist Jack Goody noted that a culture's willingness to disseminate 
its religious literature inevitably reflects an emphasis on the individual within that 
culture.[16]     The comment sheds light on the Torah’s agenda to establish an ennobled 
egalitarian citizenry, as the Torah eagerly looks to share the divine word with the people of 
Israel. Moses reads the divine word to the people at Sinai (Exodus 24:1-8).  Periodically, the 
people are to gather at the temple and hear public readings of the Torah (Deuteronomy 31:10-
13).  It is telling that the Tanakh never depicts priests or scribes as jealous or protective of 
their writing skills, as was common in neighboring cultures.[17]  
 
* * * 
 
        Turning from theology, we see that the Torah radically revamped regnant notions of 
political office and the exercise of power, with an egalitarian agenda. The Torah is the first 
work in history to adopt the rule of law. The great 20
th century political philosopher, Friedrich 
Hayek, saw Athenian political philosophy as the birthplace of the notion of equality before the 
law,[18] but it is already present in the Torah, especially in Deuteronomy. Elsewhere in the 
ancient world, the kings composed and promulgated law, but were above it, not subject to it.  
By contrast, all public institutions in the Torah—the judiciary, the priesthood, the monarchy, 
the institution of prophecy—are governed and regulated by law.[19] Moreover, the law is a 
public text whose dictates are meant to be widely known thus making abuse of power more 
obvious, and thus safeguarding the common citizenry.    
 
    Moreover, the most important body of authority in the polity envisioned by the Torah is, 
none other than the people themselves.  The Torah addresses the fraternal and egalitarian 
citizenry in the second person, “you”, and charges them with appointing a king and to appoint 
judges.  Put differently, the Torahh specifies no nominating body for appointing leaders or 
representatives. Rather, the collective “you”—the common citizenry—bears ultimate 
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we know how unthinkable it was only a few generations ago for many to contemplate the 
notion that persons of color or women should play a role in choosing who rules. For the royal 
monarchies of the ancient Near East, it was equally unfathomable that the masses—who 
elsewhere were serfs, servants— would hold any sway over those that ruled them. 
 
   Thomas Hobbes recognized the fundamental principle that rule is legitimate only if the 
people choose to surrender some of their authority to a central figure. But the origins of the 
idea that a king would be appointed only if the people wanted one are in the Torah. 
Furthermore, if the people did elect to have a king, the Torah determined that he should be but 
a shadow of what a king was elsewhere.  Elsewhere kings played central roles in the cult.  In 
the Torah he plays none.[20]  Elsewhere, the kings aimed to build a strong army.  The Torah 
calls for him to have a limited treasury and to forego a cavalry, limitations that would leave 
him commanding only a small army. Moreover, were a royal chariot force to serve as the 
backbone of the nation's defense, it would inevitably emerge as an elite military class.[21]  
The great jurist of Athens, Solon, extended preferred status to the members of the cavalry 
over other citizens. But what confers status in the Torah is citizenship in the covenantal 
community, and this is shared by all. Elsewhere, the king would consolidate his power 
through a network of political marriages.[22]  The Torah forbids the king from taking a large 
number of wives. 
 
    Finally, the Torah wrote a page in the history of constitutional thought, one that would not 
be written again until the American Founding. It pertains to a highly advanced notion of the 
separation of powers. Classical Greek political thought understood that in the absence of a 
strong monarch or a tyrant, factionalism threatened the stability of the polity. It was inevitable 
that the population would contain rich and poor, nobles and commoners. The stratification of 
the social order led classical theorists to balance power by allotting a share of the rule to each 
faction within society.  
 
     Yet, the balance of power was not a balance of institutions of government, as we are 
accustomed to today. Rather, the balance was achieved by allowing each of the 
socioeconomic factions a functioning role within each seat of government. Thus, for the 
Roman jurist Polybius the legislative branch of government in the republic was to consist of 
two bodies: the senate for the nobles and the assembly for the commoners, with each 
institution permanently enshrined in law.[23]   
 
      The  accepted  wisdom  that  the  effective division of power was predicated upon its 
distribution across preexisting societal seats of power was one that would hold sway 
throughout most of the history of political thought, from Roman theorists through early 
modern thinkers.  It is central even to the thinking of Montesquieu, the father of modern 
constitutional theory, who is credited with the separation of powers into three branches, 
executive, legislative and judiciary in his 1748 work, The Spirit of the Laws. 
 
        Looking at the English model of his day, Montesquieu held that the legislative power 
should consist of a body of hereditary nobles and of a body of commoners.[24]   He saw 
hereditary nobility not as a necessary evil, nor even as an inevitable fact of life, but rather as a 
boon to effective government. With its inherent wealth and power, the nobility would serve as 
a moderating force within government against the abuses of the monarch.[25]   Moreover, the 
fact that the nobility's strength was derived from its own resources would endow its members 
with a sense of independence. Together with developed education and time for reflection, this 
would enable the nobles to contribute to effective government in a way members of the lower 
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where the division of powers was purely institutional and instrumental, where the eligibility to 
hold office was independent of class.  
 
     Here the Torah stands distinct. Elsewhere, political office legitimizes preexisting societal 
seats of power, and is awarded upon the basis of class and kinship. For the first time in 
history, the Torah articulates a division of at least some powers along lines of institution and 
instrument without regard to social standing.  Anyone, according to the law of the king in 
Deuteronomy, who is “among your brethren” is eligible to be appointed king. Moreover, the 
king is appointed by the collective “you,” mentioned before. How that selection occurs, 
apparently, is an issue that the Torah deliberately left open, implying that there is no selecting 
body that a priori has a greater divine imprimatur than any other. 
 
    The same is true with regard to the judiciary in the book of Deuteronomy. Anyone may be 
appointed judge, and no less importantly, anyone, in theory, is eligible to participate in the 
process of appointing judges. The appointment of judges is mandated with the sole purpose of 
achieving the execution of justice, rather than the assignment of office to perpetuate the 
standing of a noble class. In this sense, Deuteronomy's notion of offices that are entirely 
institutional and instrumental is an idea that would again appear only with the American 
Founding Fathers.  
 
* * * 
 
     The Torah understood that in order to create an egalitarian order, it would also need to 
rethink the economic structure of society, for without equity, there is no equality, and it 
sought to achieve this through radical legislation on several fronts.  The first concerned the 
allocation of land, the primary source of a livelihood.  Elsewhere, land was owned by the 
palace and by the temple.[27]  The Torah, in contrast, knows of no land holding for either 
king or cult.   Instead, nearly the entire land is given to the people themselves, in an 
association of free farmers and herdsmen, subsumed within a single social class.[28] The idea 
that wide tracks of available land should be divided among the commoners was without 
precedent.   Indeed, it is hard to think of another example of this until the American 
Homestead Act of 1863.  With the Great Plains open to mass settlement, nearly any person 21 
years of age could acquire at virtually no cost a tract of 160 acres that would become his after 
five years of residence and farming. For 2 million new arrivals and other landless Americans, 
the Homestead Act was an opportunity to acquire assets and to bring equality of economic 
standing in line with equality before the law.[29] 
 
    The revamping of economic norms is evident in the Torah's approach to debt-relief.  Royal 
edicts of debt relief were common in the ancient world, and almost always declared during the 
first year of a new monarch’s reign, with clear political motivations.[30] The Greek historian 
Plutarch writes that when the Spartan ruler Agis sought to impose debt relief, the measure was 
considered by his detractors as nothing more than a Robin-Hood scheme: “By offering to the 
poor the property of the rich, and by distribution of land and remission of debts, he [bought] a 
large bodyguard for himself, not many citizens for Sparta.”[31] In contrast, debt-relief in the 
Torah is enacted every seven years, and is in no way dependent on the will of the king.  Debt 
relief, which had been a political tool of the ascending king, is now transformed to a legislated 
right of the common citizen.  
 
    With the release mandated to be enacted every seven years, the inequities of free trade 
would be leveled out on a more regular basis than they would have been elsewhere in the 
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there could be no more important legislation; equity is a vital component of equality. The 
release of debts every seven years serves as a hedge against the permanent development of an 
indigent underclass.[32]  
 
One of the elements that could contribute to a peasant’s descent into the cycle of insolvency 
was the burden of tribute or taxation. 
 
    In casting God as an economist, the Torah took specific aim at the prevailing norms of 
taxation in the ancient Near East.  Elsewhere, taxes to the state and to the cult were deeply 
integrated.[33]  In the Torah, no taxes are specified for the state.[34]  No regime would be 
able to function without taxing its populace; but the Torah apparently envisioned that taxes 
would be levied without sacral sanction, as was so prevalent elsewhere.  God would not be 
invoked as the taxman. Moreover, far less produce is demanded from the people of Israel for 
the temple than was customary in the imperial cults of the ancient Near East.[35] The priests 
and Levites that serve in the temple are considered by the Torah to be a divine honor guard.  
Whereas elsewhere, cultic personnel controlled vast tracts of land, the Torah balances the 
status that these groups maintain in the cult by denying them arable lands of their own.  They 
are dependent upon the people they represent for their subsistence, and in some passages are 
even grouped together with other categories of the underprivileged: widows, orphans, and 
aliens. The Torah further legislates that one type of tax should not be paid to the temple at all, 
but rather, distributed to the needy—the first known program of taxation legislated for a social 
purpose (Deut 14:27-29; 26:12-15).[36] 
 
      What is most remarkable about the Torah's economic reforms is the manner in which the 
new economy is incorporated into a new measure of time.  Elsewhere in the ancient Near East 
the calendar was based upon readily perceptible astronomical rhythms: the counting of days 
stems from observing the rising and setting of the sun; of months, from observations of the 
waxing and waning of the moon; of years, from observing the seasons and position of the 
sun.  The ancient Near East, however, knows no calendar that incorporates the notion of a 
week.[37]  The week is the invention of the Torah, and is rooted in the Torah's account of 
creation, in which God worked for six days, and rested on the seventh.  
 
    The new unit of time is integral to the Torah's egalitarian vision. The Sabbath principle 
regulates the schedule of the laws of social welfare, as a great equalizing force between haves 
and have-nots. The Sabbath day is a day of rest for all. In the seventh year—the "Sabbatical" 
year—the field lies fallow and is available for all to enjoy, and debt release, as we saw earlier 
is enacted in this year. Time itself is marshaled in the establishment of the egalitarian 
agenda.[38] 
 
    It may be challenged that the institution of the priesthood undermines the central thesis of 
this essay.  But when seen in ancient Near Eastern perspective, it is clear that the Torah 
designed a priesthood that would be stripped of many of the powers that priests had in 
neighboring cultures.  We have already seen how this is true with regard to land-holding and 
literacy.  To this we may add that nowhere else in the ancient world do we find pejorative 
accounts concerning the high priests.  The Torah, however, tells us only one substantive story 
about Aaron – the sin of the golden calf (Exodus 32) – and one substantive story about his 
sons – the sins of Nadab and Abihu (Leviticus 10), both stories that are pejorative in the 
extreme.  Elsewhere in the ancient Near East, temples were strictly off limits to all but temple 
officiates.  Within the Torah, the common men and women of Israel play a more active role in 
the Temple, than is found anywhere else in the ancient world.  No other culture revealed the 
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seen in ancient perspective, the power and mystique of the priesthood is greatly vitiated, and 
the status of the common citizen greatly elevated. 
 
Throughout the ancient world, the truth was self-evident: all men were not created equal.  The 
ancients saw the social world they had created, and, behold, it was good.  It was good, they 
deemed, because it was ordered around a rigid hierarchy, where everyone knew their station 
in life, each according to their class.  By contrast, the Torah articulates an integrated grand 
vision. For the first time a society was told that the gods were something other than their own 
selves writ large, in a vision that radically rethought God as it rethought man.  It introduced 
new understandings of the law, of political office, of military power, of taxation, of social 
welfare.   It conceived in radically new ways the importance of national narrative, of 
technologies of communication, and of a culture’s calibration of time.  Never, in the annals of 
human thought, has one document revolutionized so much political thought, with so little 
precedent to inspire it. 
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